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Abstract
In this work we consider a complete covert communication system, which includes the source-model of a
stealthy secret key generation (SSKG) as the first phase. The generated key will be used for the covert communi-
cation in the second phase of the current round and also in the first phase of the next round. We investigate the
stealthy SK rate performance of the first phase. The derived results show that the SK capacity lower and upper
bounds of the source-model SKG are not affected by the additional stealth constraint. This result implies that we
can attain the SSKG capacity for free when the sequences observed by the three terminals Alice (Xn), Bob (Y n) and
Willie (Zn) follow a Markov chain relationship, i.e., Xn−Y n−Zn. We then prove that the sufficient condition to
attain both, the SK capacity as well as the SSK capacity, can be relaxed from physical to stochastic degradedness.
In order to underline the practical relevance, we also derive a sufficient condition to attain the degradedness by the
usual stochastic order for Maurer’s fast fading Gaussian (satellite) model for the source of common randomness.
I. INTRODUCTION
To realize a secure physical layer, concealing the action of transmitting signals from a warden Willie
can be seen as a first step to protect information. If the action of the transmission is detected by Willie,
This work was supported in part by Fast Cloud and Fast Secure.
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2the secrecy/confidentiality (or the hidability [1]) provided by the wiretap coding [2] can be interpreted
as a further protection. There are two main notions to conceal the transmission of signals (or to attain
the deniability [1]): 1) stealthy communications [3], [1], and 2) covert communications/low probability of
detection [4], [1], [5], [6]. Roughly speaking, both notions conceal the desired signal in an ambient signal,
such that Willie is not able to distinguish from his observed distributions whether a meaningful transmission
is ongoing or not. In particular, in the first notion the meaningful and meaningless signals are transmitted
separately in time. Because these two signals have close distributions at Willie, he cannot distinguish
them. In contrast, in the second notion the transmitter is either ON or OFF and then the meaningful signal
is superimposed on the meaningless one, i.e., the additive noise. The number of messages, which can be
covertly transmitted, follows the square root law [1], [4]–[6] of the block length, i.e., the corresponding
Shannon’s rate is zero. In contrast, a positive capacity can be achievable for the stealth communications.
Note that for both notions, if the main (Bob’s) channel has no advantage over Willie’s channel, additional
keys are necessary to conceal the signals, e.g., [5], [6]. For a more detailed comparison please refer to
[7].
In this paper we aim to design a complete covert communication system by investigating the stealthy
secret key generation (SSKG) scheme with rate-unlimited public discussions. In each round of such
transmission, SSKG in the first phase can provide keys to enable the covert communications in the second
phase, when Willie has a stronger channel than Bob [6]. Instead of using normal SKG, the SSKG can
avoid Willie’s awareness during the first phase. Therefore, combining the first with the second phase, we
can attain the complete covert communication. On the contrary, normal SKG schemes may utilize public
communications for advantage distillation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification [8], which
may raise Willie’s attention. Therefore, directly applying the normal SKG scheme for the keys violates the
constraints of stealthy/covert communications. Note that when the divergence between the distributions of
channel outputs for meaningful and meaningless signals at Willie is higher than that at Bob, secret keys
shared between Alice and Bob are necessary [6, Theorem 2] to achieve covert communications. These
3keys are used to switch between different codebooks to calm Willie.
The reason we consider stealth but not covert communications for the SKG is due to the latency. It is
known that covert communications result in a zero rate when the block length approaches infinity (but the
number of transmitted messages can be positive) [6], [5]. Even under finite block length, the extreme low
rate due to the covert communications constraint will incur an extremely high latency if, for example, we
exploit covert communications in the public discussion to avoid Willie’s awareness. Further theoretical
analysis on the minimum rate of public discussion necessary for maximum SK rate can be referred to
[9]∗. The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We consider the stealthy source-model SKG and the effective secrecy [3] for the source-model SKG.
Based on the effective secrecy constraint, we derive the capacity lower and upper bounds for SSKG,
which correspond to those of SKG without the stealth constraint. It implies that the stealthy SK
capacity is unchanged when the common randomness is degraded.
• We then prove that the sufficient condition to attain the SSK capacity can be relaxed from physical
to stochastic degradedness.
• We also derive a sufficient condition to attain the degradedness by the usual stochastic order [10] for
Maurer’s fast fading Gaussian (satellite) model [11] for the source of common randomness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the preliminaries and the
considered system model. In Section III we derive our main results. In Section IV we derive the sufficient
condition to attain the degradedness. Finally Section V concludes this paper.
Notation: Upper case normal/bold letters denote random variables/random vectors (or matrices), which
will be defined when they are first mentioned; lower case bold letters denote vectors. And we denote
the probability mass function (pmf) by P. The entropy of X is defined as H(X). The mutual information
between two random variables X and Y is denoted by I(X ;Y ). The divergence between distributions PX
∗Please note that this reference considers the model where Willie observes an independent source to Alice’s and Bob’s observation.
4and PY is denoted by D(PX ||PY ). The complementary cumulative density function (CCDF) is denoted by
F¯X(x) = 1−FX(x), where FX(x) is the CDF of X . The notion X ∼ F denotes that the random variable
X follows the distribution F . The subscript i in Xi denotes the i-th symbol and X i , [X1, X2, · · · , Xi].
X −Y −Z denotes the Markov chain. o(.) is the little-o notation for computational complexity. Let d.e
denote the ceil operator. All logarithms are with base 2. The stochastic independence between X and Y
is denoted by X ⊥⊥ Y .
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM MODEL
From [6, Theorem 2] we know that given two channels to Bob and Willie, respectively, if Willie can
distinguish meaningful and meaningless signals better than Bob, the following amount of secret key bits
are necessary to enable covert communications:
logK = ωn
√
n[(1+ξ)D(PZ||QZ)− (1−ξ)D(PY ||QY )]+, (1)
where PY and QY are the output distributions at Bob when Alice is ON and OFF, respectively. Same
definitions for PZ and QZ at Willie; ωn
√
n is the number of the transmitted non-innocent symbols within
the codeword length n with the constraint ωn = o(1)∩ω(1/√n) when n→∞. On the contrary, if Bob can
distinguish meaningful or meaningless signals better than Willie in terms of the divergence of these two
distributions, no additional keys are needed for covert communications. However, for the former case to
generate the key, normal SKG schemes may attract Willie’s attention. Therefore, to attain complete covert
communications, we investigate the SKG with the stealth constraint. In the considered system, there are
two phases for each round of the complete covert communication as shown in Fig. 1. In the first phase,
Alice and Bob will use the SSKG to generate keys. In the second phase, part of the generated keys are
used for the covert communications to fulfill (1). Note that the remaining keys will be used for the next
round of SSKG, which will be explained later†. In the following we focus on the development of the first
phase, where the n-time source observations at Alice, Bob, and Willie are denoted by Xn, Y n, and Zn,
†A one-time initial key should be shared between Alice and Bob before the whole operation, which is out of the scope of this work.
5respectively, following the distribution PXnY nZn =∏ni=1 PXY Z with alphabets X , Y , Z, respectively. Denote
the public discussion between Alice and Bob by a vector F ∈ X r through a noiseless channel, from which
Willie can perfectly observe F .
SSKG Covert communication SSKG Covert communication SSKG
1st round transmission 2nd round transmission
Fig. 1. The proposed transmission scheme for a complete covert communication when Bob has a worse channel than Willie in the sense
that (1−ξ)D(PY ||QY )< (1+ξ)D(PZ ||QZ).
The main step for deriving the SSK capacity lower bound in this paper hinges on constructing a
conceptual wiretap channel (CWTC) as in [12], where we set r = n. Note that the selection of r = n is
due to the construction of the CWTC. In [13], the authors proposed a different scheme with r = 1 to
achieve the same SK capacity lower bound. We construct an equivalent wiretap codebook {Un(m,w)},
where m = 1, · · · ,L and w = 1, · · · ,L1, L , 2nR and L1 , 2nR1 are the numbers of secure and confusion
messages, respectively; m and w are uniformly selected, respectively; Un(m,w)∈ X n, ∀(m,w). In addition,
(Zn,F ,Un)∼ PZnFUn =∏ni=1 PZFU =∏ni=1 PZF |U PU , where we consider the equivalent channel from Alice
to Willie as:
PZnF |Un =
n
∏
i=1
PZF |U , (2)
i.e., the equivalent channel output at Willie is (Zn, F ). Similarly, the equivalent channel output at Bob
is (Y n, F ). Let Un be independent to {Xn, Y n, Zn}. To consider the behavior of stealth, the distributions
of the meaningful and meaningless signals at the equivalent channel output at Willie are respectively
expressed as:
PZnF =
1
LL1
(L,L1)
∑
(m,w)=(1,1)
PZn,F |Un(zn, f n|un(m,w)), (3)
QZnF =∑
un
PZn,F |Un(zn, f n|un)PUn(un). (4)
6In this work, we consider the following constraints:
Pe , Pr(K 6= Kˆ)≤ ε, (5)
R−H(K)≤ ε, (6)
D(PKZnF ||PKPZnF )+D(PZnF ||QZnF )≤ ε, (7)
where (5) is the average error probability constraint at Bob; (6) is the uniformity constraint of the keys; (7)
is the effective secrecy constraint, where the first term denotes the non-confusion [3] in a strong secrecy
manner. In addition, the second term of (7) denotes the non-stealth. We can further rearrange (7) by the
following:
D(PKZnF ||PKPZnF )+D(PZnF ||QZnF )
= ∑
K,Zn,F
PKZnF
(
log
PKZnF
PKPZnF
+ log
PZnF
QZnF
)
= ∑
K,Zn,F
PKZnF
(
log
PKZnF
PKQZnF
)
,D(PKZnF ||PKQZnF ). (8)
Borrowing the terminology from [3], we coin (8) as the effective secrecy for SSKG. The main difference
of this work to [3] will be discussed later.
In fact, we can combine the uniformity constraint of the SKG (6) with (8) as follows:
D(PKZnF ||PKQZnF )+ log |K |−H(K) =∑PKZnF
(
log
PKZnF
PKQZnF
)
−∑PKZnF log
(
PUnif
PK
)
=D(PKZnF ||PUnifQZnF ). (9)
Note that a common assumption for the public discussion channel is that all parties can access the
same discussed signal. To operate under this assumption, additional keys shared between Alice and Bob
are necessary for them to distinguish the meaningful signal when Willie is kept unaware, which is one
of the main reason that we need the SSKG in the first phase. Otherwise, from channel resolvability it is
clear that Bob cannot distinguish whether the received signal is meaningful or meaningless, either. We
7define the rate of the additional keys as Rk,st . In the following we derive a SSK rate generated by the
SSKG, namely, RSSK , which is sufficient to encompass both Rk,st (for the first phase in the next round of
transmission) and the key rate required by the covert communications (for the second phase in the current
round).
Lemma 1. To achieve a complete covert communication system, the following SK rate RSSK is sufficient
RSSK = 1+
o(1)√
n
bits/channel use. (10)
Proof: For each discussion it takes at most 1 bit to indicate that it is meaningful or not. Therefore,
we set Rk,st = 1 due to the specific use of public channel [12], which results in r = n. In addition, the
square root law of the key rate required by covert communications [6, Theorem 2] results in the key rate
upper bound o(1)/
√
n.
Remark 1. The generated SSK bits can be used in different ways for the first phase of each round of
transmission. For example, the SSK bit can be used to indicate either each transmitted symbol, or n-
symbol (i.e., the length of the SSKG), are meaningful or not. Lemma 1 corresponds to the former case,
which consumes the largest number of keys. Therefore, Lemma 1 provides us an upper bound of SSK rate
for a complete covert communication. On the other hand,
III. MAIN RESULT AND PROOF
Theorem 1. The lower and upper bounds of the stealthy secret key capacity CE f fSK of the source-model
stealthy secret key generation given a discrete memoryless source (X ,Y ,Z,PX ,Y,Z) are
max{I(X ;Y )− I(X ,Z), I(Y ;X)− I(Y ;Z)} ≤CE f fSK ≤min{I(X ;Y ), I(X ,Y |Z)}. (11)
Remark 2. Note that we do not directly apply the effective secrecy [3] which includes both secrecy and
stealth constraints, to the public discussion in SKG problems. In contrast, we impose the stealth constraint
to the CWTC [12] of the SKG and the secrecy constraint is still applied to the source-model SKG.
8Unlike the wiretap channel with the stealth constraint whose capacity result is shown in [3], Theorem
1 only provides the lower and upper bounds. These bounds coincide with those of the secret key capacity
without the stealth constraint. However, the same upper and lower bounds of the secret key capacity do
not guarantee that the secret key capacity is unchanged when we impose the additional stealth constraint.
Therefore, we consider the following case in which the two bounds match. This case leads to the fact
that we can get the SSKG for free even with the additional stealth constraint.
Corollary 1. For the discrete memoryless source (X ,Y ,Z,PXY Z), if X −Y −Z forms a Markov chain,
then
CE f fSK = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z). (12)
Remark 3. By applying the quantization scheme used in [14, Proof of Theorem 3.3 and Remark 3.8] or
[15, Appendix B], we may extend the SK rate results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to the Gaussian
source.
The proofs are derived in the following subsections.
A. Lower Bound of CE f fSK
To derive the lower bound of CE f fSK in (11), we first decompose the RHS of (8) as follows:
D(PKZnF ||PKQZnF ) (a)= D(PK||PK)+D(PZnF |K||QZnF |PK)
= D(PZnF |K||QZnF |PK), (13)
where (a) follows the chain rule of divergence from [16, Th.2.2.2].
Based on the CWTC, we then apply the channel resolvability analysis [17] to find the rate constraint on
R1, i.e., the rate of confusion messages for the codebook generation, which guarantees that the effective
secrecy constraint (7) is fulfilled.
From the random coding analysis derived in Appendix I, we have:
EC [D(PZnF |K||QZnF |PK)]≤ EZnFUn
[
log
(
PZnF |Un
L1QZnF
+1
)]
, (14)
9where we recall that L1 = 2dnR1e is the number of confusion message per bin, which is to be designed
to guarantee that (14) is asymptotically zero. The main difference of this proof to that in [3] is that, by
constructing a CWTC for the considered SKG model, we introduce an additional channel output at both
Bob and Willie. This difference makes the considered conceptual channel distinct from that in [3], and
those results cannot directly be applied.
To proceed, we reexpress the ratio in the logarithm on the right hand side (RHS) of (14) as follows:
PZnF |Un
L1QZnF
(a)
=
PZnFUn
L1PUn
1
PZnQF
(b)
=
PZnFUn
L1PZnUn
1
QF
=
PF |ZnUn
L1QF
, (15)
where (a) is due to the fact that Zn and F are independent when the discussion F is meaningless, whose
pmf is denoted by QF ; (b) is due to the fact that Un is selected to be independent to Zn, i.e., PZnUn =PZnPUn .
Then we can rewrite (14) as follows:
EC [D(PZnF |K||QZnF |PK)]≤ EZnFUn
[
log
(
PF |ZnUn
L1QF
+1
)]
. (16)
Similar to [3], the RHS of (16) can be divided into two cases as follows according to whether (zn, f , un)
are jointly typical or not:
d1 = ∑
(zn, f ,un)∈
T nδ (PZn,F ,Un)
PZnFUn(zn, f ,un) log
(
PF |UnZn( f |unzn)
L1QF ( f )
+1
)
,
d2 = ∑
(zn, f ,un)/∈
T nδ (PZn,F ,Un)
PZnFUn(zn, f ,un) log
(
PF |UnZn( f |unzn)
L1QF ( f )
+1
)
,
where T nδ follows the δ-robust typicality [18] definition for the subsequent derivation. Note that the set
of sequences xn satisfying the definition of robust typicality is denoted by T nδ (PX).
Remark 4. Note that even though Zn and F are independent and Zn and Un are independent by assumption,
that does not mean Zn, F , and Un are necessarily generated according to PZn,F ,Un =PZnPF ,Un or PZn,F ,Un =
10
PZnPF PUn . In fact, since pairwise independence does not imply mutual independence [19, Chapter 7.1,
7.2], there exists joint distribution PZn,F ,Un such that we can apply the jointly typical arguments.
The Chernoff bound and the important upperbound which will be used later are restated in the following.
Lemma 2. (Chernoff Bound [18, Lemma 16]:) For every a ∈ X ,
P
(
N(a|xn)
n
≤ (1+δ)PX(a)
)
≤ e−δ2PX (a)n/3. (17)
Lemma 3. (Upper bound of the probability of non-typical set [18, Lemma 17]:)
P(xn /∈ Tδ)≤ 2|SX |e−δ
2µX n/3, (18)
where SX , {x ∈ X : P(x)> 0} and µx ,minx∈SX P(x).
Note that the total rate constraint in the CWTC, i.e., Bob should be able to decode both the secret and
confusion messages successfully, which is a point to point transmission problem without secrecy, can be
seen from [18]. Therefore, we neglect the proof.
Next, we derive the constraint on R1 as follows:
d1
(a)
≤
(
∑
(zn, f ,un)∈T nδ (PZnFUn)
PZnFUn(zn, f ,un)
)
log
(
2−n[H(F |UZ)−δ]
L12−n(1+ε)H(F)
+1
)
(b)
≤ log
(
2−n[H(F |UZ)−δ]
L12−n(1+ε)H(F)
+1
)
(c)
= log
(
2−n(R1−I(F ;UZ)−ε
′)+1
)
, (19)
where (a) is by [18, Lemma 18, Lemma 20] for the typicality and conditional typicality bounds; (b) is
by the fact that the sum probability of jointly typical set is less than 1; (c) is by the definition of L1 and
ε′ , ε(1+H(U)). Then we know that d1→ 0 when n→ ∞ if
R1 > I(F ;UZ)
(a)
= I(U⊕X ;UZ) (b)= H(U)−H(X |Z), (20)
where (a) is by the specific use of the public discussion according to [12, Theorem 3], ⊕ is the modulo
addition in X ; (b) is due to the fact that U is uniformly distributed followed by the crypto lemma. In
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addition, we can derive that d2→ 0 as n→ ∞ as follows:
d2
(a)
≤ ∑
(zn,un, f )/∈T nδ (PZn,Un,F )
PZnFUn(zn, f ,un) log
(
1
QF ( f )
+1
)
(b)
≤ ∑
(zn,un, f )/∈T nδ (PZn,Un,F )
PZnFUn(zn, f ,un) log
(
1
µ f
+1
)
(c)
= P((zn,un, f ) /∈ T nδ (PZn,Un,F )) log
(
1
µ f
+1
)
(d)
≤ 2|SZUF |e−δ2µZUF n/3 log
(
1
µ f
+1
)
, (21)
where (a) is due to the fact that PF |UnZn( f |unzn)≤ 1 and L1 > 1, and therefore, removing PF |UnZn( f |unzn)/L1
will upper bound d2; (b) is by lower bounding QnF ( f ) with µ f = min f∈SF QF ( f ), where SF , {QF ∈ X r :
P( f )> 0}; (c) is by definition of probability; (d) is by Lemma 3. From (21) it can be easily seen that if
n→ ∞, d2→ 0 exponentially fast.
Then from (19) and (21) it is clear that (7) is fulfilled.
From the CWTC construction we know that the following rate between Alice and Bob is achievable:
n(R+R1)≤ I(Un;Un⊕Xn,Y n)
= H(Un⊕Xn,Y n)−H(Un⊕Xn,Y n|Un)
(a)
= H(Un)+H(Y n)−H(Xn,Y n)
= H(Un)−H(Xn|Y n), (22)
where (a) is due to the crypto lemma and the selection of Un is independent to Y n. Then from (20) and
(22), we can derive the achievable SSK rate as follows:
nR≤ H(Un)−H(Xn|Y n)−nR1
(a)
< n[H(X |Z)−H(X |Y )]
= n[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)], (23)
where (a) is by substituting (20) in addition to the assumption of memoryless and independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) common randomness. Due to symmetry between Alice and Bob, their role
12
can be exchanged and the other lower bound derived. This completes the proof.
Note that from the chain rule of the divergence we know that
D(PZnF ||QZnF ) = D(PF ||QF )+D(PZn|F ||QZn|F |PF ). (24)
Since the left hand side of (24) is constrained by (7) and the conditional divergence is nonnegative, we
know that the effective secrecy of the SSKG implies D(PF ||QF )≤ ε.
Remark 5. When applying the crypto lemma in (20) or (22) for unbounded X, e.g., Gaussian cases, we may
follow the argument in [20, Appendix B]. In particular, a mutual information gap δ1 can be introduced.
Note that δ1→ 0 when the modulo size approaches infinity.
B. Upper Bound of CE f fSK
In this subsection we derive the upper bound of CE f fSK as follows, which is mainly adapted from the
normal steps to derive the upper bound of source-model SKG, e.g., [8, Sec. 4.2.1], with modification to
encompass the effective secrecy constraint:
nR≤ logd2nRe
(a)
≤ H(K)+ ε
(b)
≤ H(K|F ,Zn)+D(PKZnF ||PKPZnF )+D(PZnF ||QZnF )+ ε
(c)
≤ H(K|F ,Zn)+2ε
= I(K; Kˆ|F ,Zn)+H(K|Kˆ,F ,Zn)+2ε
(d)
≤ I(K; Kˆ|F ,Zn)+ ε2
(e)
≤ I(XnRX F B;Y nRY F A|F ,Zn)+ ε2
≤ I(XnRX ;Y nRY |F ,Zn)+ ε2
( f )
≤ I(XnRX ;Y nRY |Zn)+ ε2
(g)
= I(Xn;Y n|Zn)+ ε2
(h)
= nI(X ;Y |Z)+ ε2,
13
where (a) is by (6); (b) is by definition of divergence and the fact that divergence is positive; (c) is from
(7); (d) is due to Fano’s inequality: H(K|Kˆ,F ,Zn) ≤ ε1 and by defining ε2 , 2ε+ ε1; (e) follows the
chain rule K−XnRX F B−Y nRY F A− Kˆ, where RX and RY are the local randomness, F A and F B are the
discussion signals sent by Alice and Bob, respectively, and F = (F A, F B); (f) is due to [8, Lemma 4.2];
(g) is due to the fact that the local randomness (RX ,RY ) is selected to be independent to (Xn,Y n,Zn); (h)
follows from the fact that (X ,Y,Z) is a memoryless source.
Following the same steps, we can derive another upper bound without conditioning on Z, which
completes the proof.
Remark 6. Other tighter outer bounds derived by, e.g., the intrinsic conditional information [8, P. 130]
and reduced intrinsic conditional information [8, P. 133] can be proved unchanged even when the stealthy
public discussion is considered. This is because that those derivation is irrelevant to the stealth constraint.
IV. ON THE SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR DEGRADED COMMON RANDOMNESS
In the following, we prove that the sufficient condition to achieve CE f fSK = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z), i.e., the
common randomness forming a Markov chain X −Y −Z, which is physically degraded, can be relaxed
to be stochastically degraded. We then show that the relaxed condition can be fulfilled in a broader
sense by considering Maurer’s fast fading Gaussian (satellite) model [11]. More specifically, there exists
a central random source S passing through fast fading additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels
and then observed as X , Y , and Z at Alice, Bob, and Willie, respectively. We apply the usual stochastic
order [10] to derive a sufficient condition on the fading channels such that CE f fSK is achieved. The derived
sufficient condition provides a simple way to verify the stochastic degradedness and thereby to identify
the effective SK capacity. We first give the definition on the degraded relation between the common
randomness followed by our result.
Definition 1. A source of common randomness (X ,Y ,Z,PXY˜ Z˜) is called stochastically degraded if the
conditional marginal distributions PY˜ |X and PZ˜|X are identical to those of another source of common
14
randomness (X ,Y ,Z,PXY Z) following the physical degradedness, i.e., X−Y −Z.
Theorem 2. If a source of common randomness (X ,Y ,Z,PXY˜ Z˜) is stochastically degraded such that
PY˜ |X = PY |X and PZ˜|X = PZ|X , where X−Y −Z, then CE f fSK = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z).
Proof: We prove that the stochastically degraded source (X ,Y˜ , Z˜) implies that the corresponding
CWTC is also stochastically degraded. This implies that CE f fSK is the same as that of the CWTC from a
physically degraded source of common randomness by the same marginal property of WTC. We start from
checking the CWTC of the source (X ,Y,Z), where the equivalently received signals at Bob and Willie
are Y ′ , (Y,U⊕X) and Z′ , (Z,U⊕X), respectively. If X−Y −Z, then U−Y ′−Z′, i.e., the CWTC is a
physically degraded one, which can be proved by showing I(U ;Z′|Y ′) = 0 as follows:
I(U ;Z′|Y ′) = H(Z′|Y ′)−H(Z′|Y ′,U)
(a)
= H(Z,U⊕X |Y,U⊕X)−H(Z,U⊕X |Y,U⊕X ,U)
(b)
= H(U⊕X |Y,U⊕X)+H(Z|Y,U⊕X)−H(Z,U⊕X |Y,U⊕X ,U)
= H(Z|Y,U⊕X)−H(Z,U⊕X |Y,U⊕X ,U)
(c)
= H(Z|Y )−H(Z,U⊕X |Y,U⊕X ,U)
(d)
= H(Z|Y )−H(U⊕X |Y,U⊕X ,U)−H(Z|Y,U⊕X ,U)
= H(Z|Y )−H(Z|Y,U⊕X ,U)
(e)
= H(Z|Y )−H(Z|Y,X ,U)
( f )
= H(Z|Y )−H(Z|Y,X)
= I(X ;Z|Y )
(g)
= 0, (25)
where (a) is by definition of Y ′ and Z′; (b) is by the chain rule of entropy; (c) is by the crypto lemma
and U is selected to be independent to Y and Z; (d) is again by the chain rule of entropy; (e) is from
the fact that given U , we can know X from U ⊕X ; (f) is by again by the selection that U is selected
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to be independent to X , Y and Z; (g) is due to X −Y −Z. Due to the CWTC, we can invoke the same
marginal property [21, Lemma 2.1]: if there exist other equivalent channel outputs Y ′′ , (Y˜ ,U ⊕X) and
Z′′ , (Z˜,U ⊕X) at Bob and Willie, respectively, and if PY ′′|U = PY ′|U and PZ′′|U = PZ′|U , then the two
WTCs have the same capacity-equivocation region. Since
PY ′ = PYU⊕X
(a)
= PYU
(b)
= PY PU , (26)
where (a) is due to the crypto lemma and (b) is by the selection of U to be independent to the common
randomness, we then have PY ′|U = PY . Similarly, we have PZ′|U = PZ , PY ′′|U = PY˜ , and PZ′′|U = PZ˜ .
If (U,Y ′′,Z′′) forms a stochastically degraded WTC corresponding to the physically degraded WTC
(U,Y ′,Z′), from [22, Lemma 13.16] we have
PZ′′|U(z|u) =∑
y
PY ′′|U(y|u)PZ′|Y ′(z|y)
(a)
= ∑
y
PY (y)PZ′|Y ′(z|y), (27)
where (a) is by PY ′′|U = PY ′|U = PY . Therefore, by PZ′′|U = PZ′|U , we have
PZ˜(z) =∑
y
PY (y)PZ′|Y ′(z|y). (28)
Now consider the stochastically degraded source of common randomness (X ,Y˜ , Z˜) fulfilling PY˜ |X = PY |X
and PZ˜|X = PZ|X . Similar to CWTC, we consider the following property for the stochastically degraded
source (X ,Y˜ , Z˜) according to Definition 1:
PZ˜|X(z|x) =∑
y
PY˜ |X(y|x)PZ|Y (z|y)
(a)
= ∑
y
PY |X(y|x)PZ|Y (z|y), (29)
where (a) is by PY˜ |X = PY |X . After marginalization over X on both sides of (29), we get
PZ˜(z) =∑
y
PY (y)PZ|Y (z|y). (30)
In addition, we can derive that
PZ′|Y ′ =
PZ′Y ′
PY ′
(a)
=
PY ZX⊕U
PY PU
(b)
=
PY ZU
PY PU
(c)
=
PY ZPU
PY PU
= PZ|Y , (31)
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where (a) is by definitions of Y ′ and Z′ and due to (26); (b) is by the crypto lemma; (c) is by the selection
of U . From (31) we know that the expressions of the stochastic degradedness of the source and CWTC,
i.e., (28) and (30), are the same. Then it follows that the stochastically degraded (X ,Y˜ , Z˜) implies that
(U,Y ′′,Z′′) is also stochastically degraded, vice versa. In addition, by the same marginal property, the
WTCs formed by (U,Y ′,Z′) and (U,Y ′′,Z′′) have the same secrecy capacity, which completes the proof.
From Theorem 2 we can have the following observation.
Corollary 2. The lower bound in Theorem 1 is tight for stochastically degraded source of common
randomness (X , Y˜ , Z˜).
Proof: Due to same marginal property, we have PY˜ |X = PY |X and PZ˜|X = PZ|X , which imply PY˜ = PY
and PZ˜ = PZ . Then by definition of mutual information, we can easily see that
I(X ;Y˜ )− I(X ; Z˜) = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z). (32)
Remark 7. However, the upper bound in Theorem 1 cannot be tight when Theorem 2 is valid. This is
because
I(X ;Y ′|Z′) = I(X ;Y ′Z′)− I(X ;Z′)
= I(X ;Y ′)− I(X ;Z′)+ I(X ;Z′|Y ′)
(a)
= I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)+ I(X ;Z′|Y ′),
where (a) is by the same marginal property. Note that I(X ; Z˜|Y˜ ) cannot be zero since I(X ; Z˜|Y˜ ) = 0 if and
only if X− Y˜ − Z˜ [16, Theorem 2.5]. But here there is no such Markov chain X− Y˜ − Z˜.
In the following we give an example scenario of Theorem 2.
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Example 1: Consider Maurer’s fast fading Gaussian (satellite) model [11] as follows:
X = AX S,
Y = X +NY = AX S+NY ,
Z = AZS+NZ, (33)
where NY and NZ are independent AWGNs at Bob and Willie, respectively, while both are with zero mean
and unit variance; AX and AZ follow CDFs FX and FZ , respectively, are the i.i.d. fast fading channel gains
from the source S to Alice and Willie, respectively. Note that Y and Z have no degradedness relation in
general due to the random fading. Commonly, we only consider deterministic channel gains with the order
a2X ≥ a2Z to form the stochastic degradedness, where aX and aZ are realizations of AX and AZ , respectively.
However, the following result broadens the scenarios to get the degradedness among different observations
of the same source.
Theorem 3. If the random channels AX and AZ fulfill F¯A2X (x) ≥ F¯A2Z(x) for all x, where the subscripts
denote the absolute square of the channels, then (X ,Y,Z) is equivalent to the observations of a source
(Xˆ ,Yˆ , Zˆ), which is degraded, where Xˆ = AˆX S, Yˆ = AˆX S+NY , Zˆ = AˆZS+NZ , Aˆ2X = F
−1
A2X
(U), Aˆ2Z = F
−1
A2Z
(U),
U ∼Unif(0,1), U ⊥⊥ {NY ,NZ,S}.
Proof: To proceed, we first introduce the following definition and theorem.
Definition 2. [10, (1.A.3)] For random variables A and B, A≤st B if and only if F¯A(a)≤ F¯B(a) for all a.
Let A =st A′ denote that A and A′ have the same distribution.
Theorem 4. Coupling [23]: A≤st B if and only if there exists random variables Aˆ=st A and Bˆ=st B such
that Aˆ≤ Bˆ almost surely.
Therefore, from Theorem 4 we have observations at Bob and Willie as Yˆ = AˆX S+NY and Zˆ = AˆZS+NZ ,
respectively, where Aˆ2X ≥ Aˆ2Z almost surely, and FA2X (x) = FAˆ2X (x) and FA2Z(x) = FAˆ2Z(x), for all x. Similar to
the proof steps in Theorem 2, by the same marginal property when considering the CWTC, (Xˆ ,Yˆ , Zˆ) form
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equivalently stochastically degraded observations to the original ones (X ,Y,Z) in the sense of having the
same SK capacity. Therefore, it is clear that F¯A2X (x)≥ F¯A2Z(x) is a relaxed sufficient condition to guarantee
that Z is an equivalently stochastically degraded version of Y . The equivalent channels can be explicitly
constructed as Aˆ2X = F
−1
A2X
(U) and Aˆ2Z = F
−1
A2Z
(U), is according to, e.g., the proof of [24, Proposition 2.3].
Example 2: Continuing Example 1, assume AX and AZ are from fading channels with their magnitudes
following Nakagami-m distribution with shape parameters mx and mz, and spread parameters wx and wz
[25], respectively. From Theorem 2 we know that Z is a degraded version of Y if
γ
(
mx, mxwx x
)
Γ(mx)
≥
γ
(
mz,
mz
wz
x
)
Γ(mz)
, ∀x,
where γ(s,x) =
∫ x
0 t
s−1e−tdt is the incomplete gamma function and Γ(s) =
∫ ∞
0 t
s−1e−tdt is the ordinary
gamma function. An example satisfying the above inequality is (mx,wx) = (1,3) and (mz,wz) = (1,2).
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we investigate the effect of stealthy public discussion used in the source-model of secret
key generation. The results show that the SK capacity lower and upper bounds of the source-model are
not affected by the additional stealth constraint. This implies that we can attain the stealthy SK capacity
for free when the common randomness forms a Markov chain. We then prove that the sufficient condition
to attain the SK capacity can be relaxed from physical to stochastic degradedness. We also derive a
sufficient condition to attain the degradedness by the usual stochastic order for Maurer’s fast fading
Gaussian (satellite) model for the common randomness source.
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APPENDIX I. PROOF OF (14)
EC [D(PZnF |K||QZnF |PK)]
(a)
= EC [D(PZnF |M||QZnF |PM)]
(b)
= EC ,M
[
∑
zn,F
PZn,F |M(zn, f |M = m) log
(
PZn,F |M(zn, f |M = m)
QZn,F (zn, f )
)]
(c)
= EC ,M
[
∑
zn,F
L1
∑
w=1
1
L1
PZn,F |Un(zn, f |un(m,w)) log
(
∑L1l=1
1
L1
PZn,F |Un(zn, f |un(m, l))
QZn,F (zn, f )
)]
(d)
=
1
LL1
EC
[
∑
zn,F
L
∑
m=1
L1
∑
w=1
PZn,F |Un(zn, f |un(m,w)) log
(
∑L1l=1 QZn,F |Un(z
n, f |un(m, l))
L1PZn,F (zn, f )
)]
(e)
=
1
LL1
EC
[
∑
zn,F
L
∑
m=1
L1
∑
w=1
PZn,F |Un(zn, f |un(m,w)) log
(
Mm (zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)]
( f )
=
1
LL1
∑
un(1,1)
· · · ∑
un(L,L1)
L,L1
∏
m=1,w=1
PnU(u
n(m,w))
[
∑
zn,F
L
∑
m=1
L1
∑
w=1
PZn,F |Un(zn, f |un) log
(
Mm (zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)]
(g)
=
1
LL1
∑
un(1,1)
· · · ∑
un(L,L1)
L,L1
∏
m=1,w=1
PnU(u
n(m,w))
∑
zn,F

(PZn,F |Un(·|un(1,1))+ · · · +PZn,F |Un(·|un(1,L1))) · log
(
M1(zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)
+
... . . .
...
(PZn,F |Un(·|un(L,1)) · · · +PZn,F |Un(·|un(L,L1))) · log
(
ML(zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)

(h)
=
1
LL1
∑
un(1,1)
· · · ∑
un(L,L1)
∑
zn,F

(
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(1,1))
L,L1
∏
m6=1,w6=1
PnU(u
n(m,w))+ · · ·+PZn,F ,Un(·,un(1,L1))
L,L1
∏
m 6=1,w 6=L1
PnU(u
n(m,w))
)
·
log
(
M1(zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)
+ · · ·(
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(L,1))
L,L1
∏
m 6=L,w6=1
PnU(u
n(m,w))+ · · ·+PZn,F ,Un(·,un(L,L1))
L,L1
∏
m 6=L,w 6=L1
PnU(u
n(m,w))
)
·
log
(
ML(zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)

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(i)
=
1
LL1
∑
zn,F

∑
un(1,1)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(1,1))EUn\Un(1,1)
[
log
(
M1(zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)]
+ · · ·+
∑
un(k,l)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(k, l))EUn\Un(k,l)
[
log
(
Mk(zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)]
+ · · ·+
∑
un(L,L1)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(L,L1))EUn\Un(L,L1)
[
log
(
ML(zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)]

( j)
=
1
LL1
∑
zn,F
(L,L1)
∑
(a,b)=(1,1)
∑
un(a,b)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(a,b))EUn\Un(a,b)
[
log
(
Ma (zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)]
(k)
≤ 1
LL1
∑
zn,F
(L,L1)
∑
(a,b)=(1,1)
∑
un(a,b)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(a,b)) log
(
EUn\Un(a,b)
[(
Ma (zn, f |un)
(zn, f )
)])
(l)
=
1
LL1
∑
zn,F
(L,L1)
∑
(a,b)=(1,1)
∑
un(a,b)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(a,b)) log
PZn,F |Un(·|u
n(a,b))+ ∑
s 6=b
∑
un(a,s)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(a,s))
(zn, f )

(m)
≤ 1
LL1
∑
zn,F
(L,L1)
∑
(a,b)=(1,1)
∑
un(a,b)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(a,b)) log

PZn,F |Un(·|un(a,b))+
(L,L1)
∑
(r,s)=(1,1)
∑
un(r,s)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(r,s))
(zn, f )

(n)
≤ 1
LL1
∑
zn,F
(L,L1)
∑
(a,b)=(1,1)
∑
un(a,b)
PZn,F ,Un(·,un(a,b)) log
(
PZn,F |Un(·|un(a,b))
(zn, f ) +1
)
(o)
= EZnFUn
[
log
(
PZnF |Un
L1QZnF
+1
)]
, (34)
where (a) is by constructing a CWTC, such that the key K is interchangeable with the message M;
(b) is by definition of the divergence [16, Definition 2.2]; (c) is due to the fact that PZn,F |M is the
marginalization of PZn,F |Un with respect to w, which is the index of the confusion message; in (d) we
expand the expectation with respect to M; (e) is by defining ∑L1l=1 PZn,F |Un(z
n, f |un(m, l)) and L1QZn,F (zn, f )
by Mm (zn, f |un) and (zn, f ), respectively, to simplify the expression; (f) is by definition of the expectation
over {Un(m,w)}L,L1m=1,w=1. Since {Un(m,w)} are generated independent and identically distributed using
PnU , the joint distribution of codewords in a codebook is the product of marginal distributions; in (g)
we expand the summation with respect to m and w; in (h) we expand the product according to the
form in step (g); in (i) we collect terms to form the expectation EUn\Un(k,l); in (j) we collect the terms
by introducing additional indices (a,b); in (k) we apply Jensen’s inequality to the logarithm; (l) is by
expanding the expectation EUn\Un(k,l); (m) is by adding the term PZnFUn(zn, f ,un(a,b)); (n) is by definition
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of marginalization over PZnFUn with respect to Un. In particular, the 2nd term on the RHS of the numerator
in (m) becomes EUn [PZn,F |Un] = QZnF from (4); (o) is by definition of the expectation.
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